The peacock's egg: Bhartrhari on language and reality by Johannes, Bronkhorst
THE PEACOCK'S EGG  1 
 
 
JOHANNES BRONKHORST 
 
 
The peacock's egg: 
Bhart®hari on language and reality* 
(published in: Philosophy East & West 51(4), October 2001, pp. 474-491) 
 
 
Anyone who has ever opened a book on Indian philosophy will have been struck by the 
sometimes strange doctrines that were held by the different schools, and may have 
wondered to what extent it is possible to really understand Indian philosophy. And what 
do we mean when we say that we understand this or that Indian thinker, or Indian 
philosophy in general? Indeed, to what extent did individual philosophers themselves 
understand the philosophies they wrote about? The Såµkhya philosophy, to take an 
example, proclaims the existence of twenty-five factors (which they call tattvas) which 
somehow evolve out of each other so as to create the phenomenal world. Did individual 
Såµkhya thinkers know why exactly these twenty-five factors had to be accepted, and 
not any others? Did they perhaps accept these factors simply because they had been 
sanctioned by their particular tradition, and because early exposure lent them a degree 
of plausibility which they are unlikely to acquire in the case of those who do not 
become acquainted with them until later in life? If this is the case, how much 
understanding can we, modern scholars, ever hope to attain? Are we condemned to 
merely record what the Indian thinkers thought, perhaps adding a historical dimension 
by investigating how some of these ideas succeed more or less similar earlier ones? Or 
a social one by pointing out that this or that position served the interests of this or that 
particular philosopher and those of his group? Such investigations, which put Indian 
philosophy in its historical and social contexts, are possible and extremely important, to 
be sure. Historical continuities have been studied and more will no doubt be discovered. 
But is this as far as we can go? If so, our understanding of Indian philosophy will not be 
very different from that of mythology: a number of just-so stories which we can study 
in their historical and social contexts. 
 Advocates of Indian philosophy will no doubt object that there is much more to 
Indian philosophy than just this. They will point out that some of the discussions and 
analyses resemble, sometimes anticipate, certain discussions and analyses found in 
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Western philosophy. Such advocates often have a tendency to take these discussions 
and analyses out of their original context and concentrate, say, on the development of 
logic in the Indian schools. There can be no doubt that logic underwent a remarkable 
development in India, which still draws far too little attention outside a limited group of 
experts. But this logic was used — and this is too easily overlooked — to defend the 
basic doctrinal positions of the schools concerned. These doctrinal positions themselves 
are often somehow taken for granted, or even played down, by modern investigators. If 
we wish to give these positions their due, we are back with our original question: To 
what extent can we understand the thought of an Indian [475] philosopher, not merely 
those aspects of it which we choose (and remove from their original context) because 
they remind us of issues in Western philosophy? 
 I will argue that a deeper understanding, one that goes beyond mere historical 
and sociological analyses, is possible in the case of an important part of Indian 
philosophy. This is due to a factor which too rarely draws the attention of modern 
scholars. I am speaking of the presence of a tradition of rational debate and inquiry. I 
use this expression to refer to a tradition which came to establish itself in India — or at 
least in the main philosophical schools — and which obliged thinkers to listen to the 
criticism of often unfriendly critics, even where it concerned their most sacred 
convictions, such as those supposedly based on revelation, tradition or inspiration. 
Confrontations between thinkers so radically opposed to each other were no doubt 
facilitated by the debates organized from time to time by kings, about which we have 
some first-hand information from the pen of Chinese pilgrims visiting India in the 
middle centuries of the first millennium. Little is known about the reasons why, and the 
date at which, this tradition of critical debate came to establish itself in India. Its effects 
are however visible in the efforts made by Indian thinkers to systematize their positions, 
to make them coherent and immune against criticism. 
 These reflections allow us to identify a particularly important factor in the 
development of Indian philosophy. Under pressure from competitors, the Indian 
thinkers of the early classical period were forced to do more than just preserve the 
teachings they had received; they had to improve and refine them — perhaps in order to 
avoid becoming the laughing stock of those they might have to confront at a royal court 
or at some other occasion. In doing so, they created systems of philosophy that might 
deviate considerably from the pre-systematic teachings which they had inherited. 
 The history of Indian philosophy, seen in this way, becomes the story of the 
search for coherence and immunity against criticism, starting normally — but not 
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always, it seems — from some form of traditional teaching. This traditional teaching is 
usually of a non-philosophical nature. Buddhist philosophy in its various 
manifestations, for example, based itself ultimately on the teaching of the Buddha, 
which concerned the escape from suffering and rebirth and had no philosophical 
pretensions whatsoever. Several centuries separate the Buddha from the beginning of 
Buddhist systematic philosophy, centuries during which well-meaning monks had 
ordered and organized the original teaching in various ways. Buddhist systematic 
philosophy, when it finally arose, was based upon, and continued in a way, these 
attempts at ordering and organizing. It tried to introduce coherence and drew 
conclusions. In this way Buddhist philosophy arose out of the attempt to introduce 
order and coherence in the received teachings. Other schools of philosophy proceeded 
similarly. 
 A history of Indian philosophy worth the name will have to deal in detail with 
the ways in which various early teachings were transformed into coherent systems of 
thought. This is of necessity a somewhat technical endeavor, which I do not plan to 
undertake, at least not in this lecture. However, in their search for coherence and 
immunity against criticism Indian philosophers were also confronted with the question 
to what extent their doctrines were compatible with certain convictions shared by all, 
[476] or practically all, of them. Such shared convictions existed. Practically all 
philosophers of classical India, for example, believed in the doctrine of karma, and all 
believed in the close correspondence between language and reality. The reflective 
analysis of these two convictions exerted a profound influence on the doctrines of the 
various schools. Some of these doctrines can indeed be looked upon as the direct 
outcome of this intellectual confrontation. In this lecture I will concentrate on the 
second of these two convictions, the belief in the close correspondence between 
language and reality. 
 Correspondence between language and reality means first of all that the objects 
in the phenomenal world correspond to the words of language. This may sound 
innocent enough, but was given quite amazing twists by certain thinkers. Many 
Buddhists, for example, had come to believe that the objects of our phenomenal world 
do not really exist. They do not exist, because they are composite, they consist of 
constituent parts. For reasons that cannot be dealt with at this moment these Buddhists 
maintained that only the constituent parts exist, but anything that is made up of them, 
that is macroscopic — that is to say: any of the things that fill phenomenal reality — 
does not. This led them to the following question: What are these macroscopic objects, 
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and why do we tend to think they exist? The answer is: they are nothing but words, or if 
you like: notions imposed upon reality by the words of language. Most Brahmanical 
thinkers disagreed with the imputed unreality of the phenomenal world, but agreed that 
there is a close correspondence between words and things. Some of them went to the 
extent of analyzing the use of words in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of 
objective reality. 
 All these developments, though important, cannot be dealt with in this lecture. 
However, the belief in the correspondence between language and reality was, during the 
early centuries of the common era, extended from a mere belief in the correspondence 
between words and things to something more encompassing which includes the 
conviction that also statements correspond to the situations they describe, or more 
precisely (but still not perfect): the words that make up a statement correspond to the 
"things" that constitute the situation described. Once again this conviction looks 
relatively harmless at first sight. After all, a statement like "John eats an apple" might 
be taken to describe a situation which is constituted of the three elements John, the 
apple, and the act of eating. Many, perhaps most, statements are such that they do not 
necessarily clash with this conviction, but some do. Take "John makes a pot". This 
statement describes a situation in which John and the act of making have their place, 
but the pot is not yet there. In other words, the words that make up the statement "John 
makes a pot" do not correspond to the "things" that constitute the situation described. 
The same difficulty arises whenever something is said about something coming into 
being. If we say "The pot comes into being" there is clearly nothing in the situation 
described corresponding to the word "pot". 
 I am sure that many people nowadays would conclude from statements like 
"John makes a pot" and "the pot comes into being", that apparently the words of a 
statement do not always correspond to the elements that make up the situation 
described. This would certainly be my reaction. Interestingly, to the best of my [477] 
knowledge all Indian thinkers of, say, the first five centuries of the common era did not 
draw this conclusion. I have studied the question in some detail and considered the 
writings of authors belonging to all currents of Indian philosophy, belonging to all the 
three major religions of that period: Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism. The results of 
this investigation have now come out in a small monograph.1 To my growing surprise I 
found that all these thinkers held on to this position and tried in various ways to resolve 
                                                
1 Langage et réalité: sur un épisode de la pensée indienne. Turnhout: Brepols. 1999. (Bibliothèque de 
l'École des Hautes Études, Sciences Religieuses, 105.) 133 pp. ISBN 2-503-50865-0 
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the difficulties it gave rise to. All of them believed that the words of a statement 
correspond to the elements that make up the situation described, also in the case of 
statements like "John makes a pot" and "the pot comes into being". 
 In a minute I will discuss some of the solutions that were offered to the 
problems that arise in this manner. First however I wish to deal with a question that 
may cross your minds at this point. Why did the Indian thinkers of that period, all of 
them, hold on to a conviction that is so obviously in contradiction with everyday 
experience? Is this another example of intellectuals accepting a position whose 
absurdity is visible to a child? Is this one more case of philosophers gone haywire? 
 I am not at all inclined to draw any such conclusions, and I would like to draw 
attention to two factors which no doubt encouraged the thinkers of that time not to give 
up their position simply because it seemed to contradict everyday experience. For one 
thing, a number of thinkers, most notably the Buddhists, had already for other reasons 
come to the conclusion that the phenomenal world is not ultimately real. A 
contradiction between phenomenal reality and the conviction they cherished could not, 
therefore, endanger this conviction. Equally important is the presence in India at that 
time of a tradition of rational inquiry, which I mentioned earlier. Philosophers had 
become convinced that their reasons and arguments were entitled to being taken 
seriously, as seriously or even more so than tradition, revelation, and insight. We know 
that in ancient Greece some thinkers, the Eleatics, did not hesitate to reject perceived 
reality on the basis — not of tradition, revelation, or special insight — but of mere 
argument. The early Indian thinkers, too, proceeded on the basis of their newly acquired 
confidence in the power of human reason. Those of us who feel superior to them might 
do well to recall that our phenomenal reality, too, hides a plethora of entities — 
molecules, atoms, subatomic particles — the existence of which we willingly accept on 
the basis of reasons provided and experiments carried out by others. 
 What solutions did the Indian thinkers offer to the difficulties they thus 
encountered, and which we might be tempted to consider to be of their own making? 
What does the word "pot" refer to in the sentences "John makes a pot" and "the pot 
comes into being"? The literature concerned contains a variety of answers, as I said 
earlier. Here I will concentrate on only a few of them. 
 Perhaps the simplest and in a way most obvious answer was adopted by the 
Såµkhya school of Brahmanical philosophy, mentioned earlier in this lecture. We are 
relatively well informed about the early history of this school. Most elements of its 
classical teachings figure in early works, such as the great epic of India, i.e. the 
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Mahåbhårata, and other texts. One important element, however, is never mentioned in 
these earlier accounts, and must have been a rather recent innovation. I am speaking of 
satkåryavåda, [478] the doctrine according to which the effect exists before it is 
produced. Very concretely this means that the situation described by the statement 
"John makes a pot", or "the pot comes into being", contains already a pot, be it that the 
pot at that moment is still hidden in the clay from which it is being made. 
 Satkåryavåda becomes an essential part of classical Såµkhya philosophy, is 
taken over by some schools and vehemently combated by others. The scholastic debates 
about this issue in later texts make one easily forget how profoundly strange this 
doctrine really is (not only for modern Western readers!). They may have as a further 
effect that the doctrine becomes familiar, and that one stops being surprised by its 
extraordinary content. Familiarity is easily mistaken for understanding. A better 
understanding, I submit, can be obtained by becoming aware what specific problem the 
doctrine was meant to solve. In the case of satkåryavåda this problem was the direct 
consequence of certain ideas regarding the relationship between language and reality 
shared by all thinkers of that time. 
 The problem was shared by all thinkers, but they did not all propose the same 
solution. An altogether different solution was proposed by a particularly famous 
thinker, Någårjuna. In order to understand his solution we have to take into account that 
Någårjuna was a Buddhist. The Buddhists of his time, as I pointed out earlier, had come 
to believe that the phenomenal world does not really exist. This belief had not been part 
of the message taught by the historical Buddha. It was rather the result of subsequent 
elaborations and reinterpretations of the early teachings. Whatever the details of this 
development — with which we cannot deal at this moment — the Buddhists had come 
to believe, on the presumed authority of the Buddha, that the phenomenal world does 
not really exist; they could not prove this. This however changed with Någårjuna. 
Någårjuna could prove what many Buddhists of his time were convinced of in any case, 
viz., that the phenomenal world does not exist. It does not exist, because it cannot exist. 
And it cannot exist because it is self-contradictory. 
 The basic argument to prove this has already been sketched above. The 
statement "the pot comes into being" describes a situation which must contain a pot. It 
does not. The statement is therefore contradictory and nothing comes into being. I will 
cite one verse from Någårjuna's MËlamadhyamakakårikå which deals with this 
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particular problem. It states:2 "If any unproduced entity is found anywhere it could be 
produced. Since that entity does not exist, what is produced?" In the case of our pot this 
means: if there is a pot at the time it is going to be produced, it can be produced. If there 
is no such pot, the subject of "the pot is produced" has nothing to refer to, and the 
statement is empty. This is true if we assume, as did apparently Någårjuna, that the 
terms of a statement have to refer to something that is there in the situation described. 
 Någårjuna proved, with this and similar arguments, what a number of Buddhists 
had already believed before and without him. He did however more. By introducing 
these rather nihilistic arguments into Buddhist philosophy he created an own school of 
philosophy which, known by the name Madhyamaka or Mådhyamika, survived for a 
long time in India and to this day among Tibetan Buddhists. 
 My reflections so far have shown, I hope, that at least two crucially important 
doctrines held by different schools of Indian philosophy found their historical origin 
[479] not in meditative experience or supernatural revelation but in the need to deal 
with difficulties arising from shared assumptions. The satkåryavåda of Såµkhya and 
the nihilism of Madhyamaka are both to be understood as responses to a conviction, 
shared by all thinkers of that time, concerning the relationship between language and 
reality which at first view would barely seem to justify such encompassing 
metaphysical conclusions. 
 I will now turn to Bhart®hari, a Brahmanical thinker of the 5th century of the 
common era who is best known, nowadays, as a "linguistic philosopher". Bhart®hari 
owes this reputation to the fact that the Indian grammarians, who were and remained 
primarily linguists with few or no philosophical aspirations, came to accept him as a, or 
rather the, philosopher of grammar. They added his philosophy, or part of it, to their 
own rather technical and non-philosophical reflections, and now claimed that grammar, 
too, had a philosophical dimension. Also some modern scholars have concentrated on 
aspects of Bhart®hari's thought which, they claim, shows similarities with modern 
linguistics. 
 But whatever we think of the reputation that Bhart®hari acquired in later times, 
he was, first of all, a thinker of his own time, who thought about the problems that were 
around at that time. One of the problems he had to confront is the one we have just 
discussed, the problem as to how a pot can come into being if it is not yet there. 
                                                
2 MadhK(deJ) 7.17: yadi kaßcid anutpanno bhåva˙ saµvidyate kvacit/ utpadyeta sa kiµ tasmin bhåve 
utpadyate 'sati//. 
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 There can be no doubt that this problem played a central role in Bhart®hari's 
thinking. He formulates it most clearly in the following verse:3 "If [something] exists 
[already], why does is come into being? But if it does not exist, how does it come into 
being?" What is more, he offers no less than four different solutions to this problem in 
four different parts of his Våkyapad¥ya. The challenge, as you will recall, is to find 
something that the word ‘pot’ in the statement "the pot comes into being" refers to and 
that is part of the situation described. Unlike the Såµkhyas — who claimed that the pot 
already exists at the time it comes into being —, and unlike Någårjuna — who claimed 
that the very statement is self-contradictory —, Bhart®hari presents objects that are 
present in the situation described and that are, he proposes, referred to by the word 
‘pot’. His first suggestion is that the word ‘pot’ refers to the universal that inheres in all 
pots. He had borrowed this notion of universals from another school of philosophy, but 
gives it an interpretation that is uniquely his own. For him the universal is not just an 
eternal and unchangeable "thing" that inheres in all pots; no, from Bhart®hari's point of 
view the universal plays an active role in manifesting the pot. 
 His second solution to the problem at hand is that the word ‘pot’ refers to the 
substance of which the pot is made, or better: is going to be made. This substance is 
there while the pot is being made, so that the word ‘pot’ does refer to something, even 
at the time that the pot is being produced. 
 Bhart®hari's third solution is altogether different. He realizes that the demand 
that the words constituting a sentence have to refer to something in the situation 
described leads to major difficulties, for example in the case of negative existential 
statements. If I say "Martians do not exist", what does the word ‘Martians’ refer to? Not 
to anything out there, one would say. Bhart®hari solves this problem by maintaining 
[480] that words refer to a metaphorical reality (aupacårik¥ sattå), which is different 
from absolute reality. He adds:4 "Metaphorical reality shows the own form of all 
[things] in all their states." ‘In all their states’ probably means: in the past, present and 
future. In other words, the word ‘pot’ in "the pot comes into being" refers to the 
metaphorical existence of the pot, which shows it in its future state; or more simply, 
though perhaps less accurately, it refers to the future pot. 
 Bhart®hari's fourth solution, finally, is as simple as it is obvious: the word ‘pot’ 
refers to a mental reality, i.e., to the pot that is in my mind (that I have in mind) when I 
                                                
3  Vkp 3.3.43cd: yadi saj jåyate kasmåd athåsaj jåyate katham. 
4 Vkp 3.3.39: vyapadeße padårthånåm anyå sattaupacårik¥/ sarvåvasthåsu sarve∑åm åtmarËpasya darßikå// 
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pronounce the statement "the pot comes into being". This final solution is so obvious, 
one would think, that one wonders why Bhart®hari has not offered it right from the 
beginning, and indeed, why others before him had not hit upon this solution much 
earlier. This peculiar absence may have to be explained by the fact that the thinkers I 
have mentioned so far were very concerned to distinguish themselves from the 
idealistic ideas that were gaining influence at that time in some schools of Indian 
philosophy. 
 Having briefly considered the four solutions offered by Bhart®hari to the 
problem connected with the coming into being of a pot, you may wish to know which 
of these four is Bhart®hari's own. To my knowledge the Våkyapad¥ya contains no 
indications that would allow us to make such a choice. And indeed, it seems that 
Bhart®hari did not express, and may not have had, any preference. This is the peculiar 
feature of his philosophical writings which the Dutch scholar Jan Houben has called 
Bhart®hari's "perspectivism": different positions are correct from different points of 
view. 
 This should not be taken to imply that Bhart®hari had no philosophy of his own, 
and that all he does is present various points of view without choosing between them. It 
seems quite clear that Bhart®hari has drawn at least one very clear, and important, 
conclusion from his various lucubrations about pots that do or do not come into being, 
viz., that phenomenal reality is unreal, and different from absolute reality. Bhart®hari's 
conclusion is in one important respect different from the one drawn by Någårjuna. The 
latter, if Claus Oetke's analyses are correct, had come to the conclusion that nothing 
exists, nothing is absolutely real. Bhart®hari agrees that phenomenal reality is unreal, 
but differs from Någårjuna in claiming that there is another reality that is real. After our 
reflections about the coming into being of the pot, it goes without saying that absolute 
reality for Bhart®hari does not come into being, and indeed does not change. 
 Bhart®hari's concept of absolute reality is interesting, especially if one contrasts 
it with the position of many Buddhists at his time and before him. Those Buddhists 
claimed that the objects of the phenomenal world cannot be real, because they are 
composite. These composite objects are in the end nothing but words, that is to say, 
phenomenal reality is in the end nothing but a trick played upon us by language. 
Bhart®hari agrees with the last statement. Phenomenal reality is indeed the result of 
language, but language does not combine the ultimately real constituents (as some 
Buddhists believed). On the contrary, it divides the ultimately real totality of all there is, 
which is absolute reality. 
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 Bhart®hari here introduces the notion that a whole, a totality, can be more real 
[481] than its parts. This sounds at first rather strange, but here his background in 
grammar and linguistics came to his help. It is a well-known fact, noted by thinkers 
long before Bhart®hari, that a word in language is more than the mere accumulation of 
the sounds that constitute it. Some Buddhist thinkers had, perhaps for this very reason, 
postulated, already before the beginning of the common era, that words are entities that 
are different from their constituent sounds. They had claimed the same for whole 
sentences, which are more than the combination of the words that constitute them. The 
important grammarian Patañjali (ca. 150 B.C.E), too, had made similar claims with 
regard to words. Here, then, Bhart®hari found examples of objects that are more than 
their combined constituents. Words are more than their constituent sounds, and 
sentences are more than the words in them. Strictly speaking, sounds are not parts of 
words, because the latter are altogether different entities; and words are not parts of 
sentences which, once again, are different entities. It is in this context that Bhart®hari 
brings in the example of the peacock's egg mentioned in the title of this lecture. The 
word, which in itself has no parts and no sequence, unfolds itself so as to give rise to 
something that appears to have both, just as the  vital essence (rasa) of a peacock's egg, 
which does not possess the variety of colors of a peacock, unfolds itself so as to give 
rise to a peacock that does.5 Bhart®hari generalizes this idea, and claims, for example, 
that pots, too, have no parts.6  
 For Bhart®hari, then, the world, and each object in it, has two aspects: the one 
real, the other unreal. VP 3.1.32, for example, speaks of "the real and the unreal parts 
which are present in each thing".7 The phenomenal world is unreal. It is the result of an 
(unreal) division of the undivided absolute.8 The essential reality of things, we read 
elsewhere in the Våkyapad¥ya, is beyond differentiation:9 "With regard to things 
(bhåva), whose reality is beyond differentiation (vikalpåt¥ta), the world is followed in 
linguistic expressions (vyavahåra) which are based on conventions (saµketa)." Here it 
is stated that linguistic expressions correspond to the unreal divisions of reality. 
                                                
5 Vkp 1.52: åˆ∂abhåvam ivåpanno ya˙ kratu˙ ßabdasaµjñaka˙/' v®ttis tasya kriyårËpå bhågaßo bhajate 
kramam//. The V®tti explains: ... båhyo vyåvahårika˙ ßabdo 'nta˙karaˆe mayËrådyaˆ∂arasavat ... 
pratil¥yate. 
6 Vkp 3.6.15ab: nirbhågåtmakatå tulyå paramåˆor gha†asya ca. 
7 Vkp 3.1.32ab: satyåsatyau tu yau bhågau pratibhåvaµ vyavasthitau. Cf. Bronkhorst 1991: 12 f. 
8 Vkp 3.3.72: yatra dra∑†å ca d®ßyaµ ca darßanaµ cåvikalpitam/ tasyaivårthasya satyatvaµ ßritås 
trayyantavedina˙// 
9 Vkp 3.6.25: vikalpåt¥tatattve∑u saµketopanibandhanå˙/ bhåve∑u vyavahårå ye lokas tatrånugamyate// 
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Another verse tells us more about the division here at stake:10 "Heaven, earth, wind, 
sun, oceans, rivers, the directions, these are divisions of the reality belonging to the 
inner organ, [even though] they are situated outside it." Note that this verse does not 
prove that Bhart®hari was an idealist, that he denied the existence of the outside world. 
It rather states that the divisions of the outside world are produced by the inner organ, 
and therefore by words, as we will see. 
 Words separate things from each other:11 "By force of the [fact that 
understanding has the form of words], every produced thing is distinguished [from 
other things]." "Words are the only basis of the nature of things and of their use."12 It 
follows that "those who know the nature of things see the power of words".13 Bhart®hari 
elaborates on the power of words in the following verses:14 "The power residing in 
words is the basis of this whole universe. ... Since the difference between ∑a∂ja and 
other [musical notes] is perceived [only] when explained by words, all categories of 
objects are based on the measures of words." The creative power of language is 
exemplified by the illusion of a circle created by a firebrand turned round:15 "It is 
observed in the case of a torch-wheel etc., that the form of an object is perceived on 
account of words (ßruti), even though the basis [of the perception] is [482] entirely 
different." "There is no cognition in the world that does not follow words. All 
knowledge appears as if permeated by words."16 "It is from words that things proceed; 
[words] create the distinctions [in the phenomenal world]."17 One might be tempted to 
think that this last line speaks about meanings rather than things; both are called artha 
in Sanskrit. Bhart®hari speaks however about things in the objective world. This is 
particularly clear from a passage of his commentary on the Mahåbhå∑ya, often called 
Mahåbhå∑yad¥pikå, where the perception of words such as ‘heaven’, apËrva, and 
                                                
10 Vkp 3.7.41: dyau˙ k∑amå våyur åditya˙ sågarå˙ sarito dißa˙/ anta˙karaˆatattvasya bhågå bahir 
avasthitå˙// 
11 Vkp 1.133cd: tadvaßåd abhini∑pannaµ sarvaµ vastu vibhajyate. tad- refers back to vågrËpatå 
avabodhasya in verse 132. 
12 Vkp 1.13ab: arthaprav®ttitattvånåµ ßabdå eva nibandhanam. 
13 Vkp 1.171cd: svabhåvajñais tu bhåvånåµ d®ßyante ßabdaßaktaya˙. 
14 Vkp 1.122-23: ßabde∑v evåßritå ßaktir vißvasyåsya nibandhan¥/ ... ∑a∂jådibheda˙ ßabdena vyåkhyåto 
rËpyate yata˙/ tasmåd arthavidhå˙ sarvå˙ ßabdamåtråsu nißritå˙//. On the exact reading of this verse, see 
Bronkhorst, 1988: 124. 
15 Vkp 1.142: atyantam atathåbhËte nimitte ßrutyapåßrayåt/ d®ßyate 'låtacakrådau vastvåkåranirËpaˆå//. 
Tr. Houben. 
16 Vkp 1.131: na so 'sti pratyayo loke ya˙ ßabdånugamåd ®te/ anuviddham iva jñånaµ sarvaµ ßabdena 
bhåsate// 
17 Vkp 3.14.198ab: ßabdåd arthå˙ pratåyante sa bhedånåµ vidhåyaka˙. 
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‘divinity’ are presented as means to infer (anumåna) the existence of the corresponding 
objects:18 "Just as the words ‘heaven’, apËrva and ‘divinity’, when perceived, are the 
means to infer the existence of objects never observed, ..." The same three objects — 
‘heaven’, apËrva and ‘divinity’ — are mentioned in the following, slightly obscure, 
verse of the Våkyapad¥ya:19 "The sign of the thing denoted is, that there is an object 
corresponding to all words. In the case of words like ‘cow’, they say, it is similar to 
‘heaven’, apËrva and ‘divinity’." 
 It will be clear from these quotations, that the connection between language and 
phenomenal reality is close. And the language concerned is Sanskrit. But Bhart®hari 
goes further. The fundamental unit of language is the sentence; this is equally true of 
the Vedic sentence.20 This is important. It shows that Bhart®hari does not merely 
postulate a correspondence between individual words and elements of the phenomenal 
world. The link between statements, in particular Vedic statements, and the phenomenal 
world is as important, or even more important. We'll return to this point in a minute. 
First we consider some of Bhart®hari's observations with regard to the role of the Veda 
in the unfolding of phenomenal reality:21 "Different sciences unfold, based on the 
primary and secondary limbs of that [Veda] which is the organizing principle (vidhåt®) 
of the worlds, [sciences] which are the causes of the mental traces (saµskåra) of 
knowledge." The context of this verse leaves no doubt that it actually concerns the 
Veda, and that therefore the Veda is the organizing principle, or perhaps one is entitled 
to translate: creator, of the worlds. A comparison with VP 3.14.198ab, cited above ("It 
is from words that things proceed; [words] create the distinctions [in the phenomenal 
world]"), and which, too, uses the verb vi-dhå, shows that the creation of the world is 
essentially a division, a differentiation, of the undivided absolute. Another verse 
explains the relationship between the Veda and the world in the following terms:22 
                                                
18 Mahåbhå∑yad¥pikå, Manuscript p. 11a l. 11; ‘Critical edition’ Óhnika I p. 28 l. 8-9; ed. Abhyankar-
Limaye p. 33 l. 24 - p. 34 l. 1; ed. Swaminathan p. 40 l. 11: tatra yathaiva svargåpËrvadevatåßabdå 
upalabhyamånå atyantåparid®∑†ånåm arthånåm astitvånumånam ... Bhavya's Madhyamakah®dayakårikå 
9.5 ascribes to a ‘M¥måµsaka’ the position according to which the existence of such objects is known 
from the Veda; see Kawasaki, 1976: 6-7. 
19 Vkp 2.119: asty artha˙ sarvaßabdånåm iti pratyåyyalak∑aˆam/ apËrvadevatåsvargai˙ samam åhur 
gavådi∑u// 
20 See Houben, 1995. 
21 Vkp 1.10: vidhåtus tasya lokånåm a∫gopå∫ganibandhanå˙/ vidyåbhedå˙ pratåyante 
jñånasaµskårahetava˙// Halbfass translates vidhåt® "organizing principle" (1991: 5) or 
"Organisationsprinzip" (1991a: 126). 
22 Vkp 1.124: ßabdasya pariˆåmo 'yam ity åmnåyavido vidu˙/ chandobhya eva prathamam etad vißvaµ 
pravartate// 
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"Those who know the sacred tradition know that this [universe] is a transformation of 
the word. In the beginning this universe proceeds exclusively from Vedic verses." 
 The world having been created, or organized, by the Veda, tradition (ågama / 
sm®ti) bases itself on the Veda:23 "The texts of tradition (sm®ti), which are multiform 
and have visible as well as invisible aims, have been arranged by knowers of the Veda 
on the basis of the [Veda] with the help of indicators." This implies, for Bhart®hari, that 
the link between tradition and the world is close, too. The world follows the rules of the 
word:24 "Even if [all] philosophies had disappeared, and there would not be other 
authors, the world would not deviate from the rules expressed by the Veda (ßruti) and 
by the tradition (sm®ti)." This implies, among other things, that the rules of behavior are 
in a way inherent in the world:25 "All duties (itikartavyatå) in [483] the world are based 
on words; even a child knows them because of the mental impressions (saµskåra) 
acquired earlier." The intuition (pratibhå) which is called "meaning of the sentence", 
and which makes us know our duties, can either be the result of verbal instruction, or it 
can be inborn:26 "Whether the [intuition] is directly produced by the word or by the 
result of impulsions (bhåvanå), no one deviates from it where duties (itikartavyatå) are 
concerned." Even animals are guided by this intuition:27 "Under the influence of that 
[intuition] even the animals act. ... Who changes the sound of the male cuckoo in 
spring? How have animals learnt to build nests and the like? Who induces wild animals 
and birds to eat, love, hate, swim, and so on, activities well known among the 
descendants of each species?" 
 These verses have been interpreted to mean that the hereditary knowledge one 
finds among animals and in children is the result of the use of language in an earlier 
existence.28 Nothing in the text supports this point of view. It is true that living beings 
are born with impulsions (bhåvanå) or mental traces (saµskåra) which are linguistic by 
nature, but it would appear that these linguistic impulsions are not, or not always, the 
                                                
23 Vkp 1.7: sm®tayo bahurËpåß ca d®∑†åd®∑†aprayojanå˙/ tam evåßritya li∫gebhyo vedavidbhi˙ 
prakalpitå˙//. 
24 Vkp 1.149: astaµ yåte∑u våde∑u kart®∑v anye∑v asatsv api/ ßrutism®tyuditaµ dharmaµ loko na 
vyativartate// 
25 Vkp 1.129: itikartavyatå loke sarvå ßabdavyapåßrayå/ yåµ pËrvåhitasaµskåro bålo 'pi pratipadyate// 
26 Vkp 2.146: såk∑åc chabdena janitåµ bhåvanånugamena vå/ itikartavyatåyåµ tåµ na kaßcid ativartate// 
27 Vkp 2.147cd & 149-150: samårambhå˙ pratåyante tiraßcåm api tadvaßåt// ... svarav®ttiµ vikurute 
madhau puµskokilasya ka˙/ jantvådaya˙ kulåyådikaraˆe ßik∑itå˙ katham// 
åhårapr¥tyapadve∑aplavanådikriyåsu ka˙/ jåtyanvayaprasiddhåsu prayoktå m®gapak∑iˆåm// 
28 Biardeau, 1964a: 317-18; Iyer, 1977: 62. 
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results of instructions in an earlier life.29 One could here repeat Bhart®hari's question: 
What verbal impulsions would change the sound of the male cuckoo in spring? 
Bhart®hari himself answers this question, and the others that accompany it, in the 
following verses:30 "It comes from tradition (ågama) only, which follows the 
impulsions (bhåvanå). As for the tradition, it is different [for each individual] 
depending on the proximity or distance.31 Six forms of intuition (pratibhå) are known, 
depending on whether they are produced by the own nature, the Vedic school, practice, 
Yoga, by the invisible (ad®∑†a), or by a special [cause]." It follows that there is natural 
knowledge:32 "Since knowledge is natural, the traditional religious and scientific 
treatises (ßåstra) serve no purpose whatsoever." This also applies to morality:33 "With 
regard to the two positions ‘this is virtuous’ or ‘this is sinful’, there is little use for 
religious and scientific treatises (ßåstra) right down to the untouchables." 
 Bhart®hari uses the word bhåvanå "impulsion" at several other occasions in the 
Våkyapad¥ya. The "impulsion of the word" (ßabdabhåvanå) is required to set the speech 
organs in motion, to emit an upward breath, and to make the points of articulation strike 
each other.34 The impulsions, moreover, cause the imaginary divisions of the sentence 
which has, in reality, no parts:35 "Although the meaning of the sentence is without 
divisions, the imagined divisions are based on bhåvanå." 
 The direct link between words and things explains the effects words can have on 
things:36 "Just as it is observed that colors etc. have well-defined capacities with regard 
to certain things, in the same way one observes that words [have well-defined 
capacities] to remove snake poison etc. Just as they have a capacity to do this (to 
remove snake poison etc.) it should be understood that they also [have a capacity] to 
                                                
29 One is of course reminded of the abhilåpavåsanå of the Yogåcåras, which is responsible for a number 
of percepts (vijñapti) besides the one of linguistic usage (vyavahåravijñapti). Cf. Lamotte, 1973: 88-89, 
108 (= Mahåyånasaµgraha II, 2; II, 16).  
30 Vkp 2.151-52: bhåvanånugatåd etad ågamåd eva jåyate/ åsattiviprakar∑åbhyåm ågamas tu vißi∑yate// 
svabhåvacaraˆåbhyåsayogåd®∑†opapåditåm/ vißi∑†opahitåµ ceti pratibhåµ ∑a∂vidhåµ vidu˙//. The 
reading caraˆa instead of varaˆa is here accepted, with Rau's hyparchetype n and the V®tti. 
31 The commentator Puˆyaråja explains: the tradition is sometimes acquired in this life, sometimes in 
another life. 
32 Vkp 1.150ab: jñåne svåbhåvike nårtha˙ ßåstrai˙ kaßcana vidyate. 
33 Vkp 1.40: idaµ puˆyam idaµ påpam ity etasmin padadvaye/ åcaˆ∂ålamanu∑yåˆåm alpaµ 
ßåstraprayojanam//. This verse belongs to the V®tti according to Aklujkar, 1971: 512. 
34 Vkp 1.130: ådya˙ karaˆavinyåsa˙ pråˆasyordhvaµ sam¥raˆam/ sthånånåm abhighåtaß ca na vinå 
ßabdabhåvanåm// 
35 Vkp 2.116: avikalpitavåkyårthe vikalpå bhåvanåßrayå˙. 
36 Vkp 1.155-156: rËpådayo yathå d®∑†å˙ pratyarthaµ yataßaktaya˙/ ßabdås tathaiva d®ßyante 
vi∑åpaharaˆådi∑u // yathai∑åµ tatra såmarthyaµ dharme 'py evaµ prat¥yatåm/ sådhËnåµ sådhubhis 
tasmåd våcyam abhyudayårthinåm// tr. Houben. 
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[produce] merit. Therefore, good people desiring elevation (abhyudaya), should use 
correct words." The capacity to produce merit belongs to correct words only:37 "On the 
basis of traditional knowledge [received] from the well-educated, correct words are 
established as a means towards merit. While there is no difference in expressing the 
meaning, incorrect words are the opposite (i.e., not a means towards merit)." 
[484] 
 The link between words and things having been established, the study of lan-
guage, and of Sanskrit in particular, enables one to reach conclusions about the world. 
Bhart®hari uses the words of Patañjali, who says in his Mahåbhå∑ya:38 "We accept the 
word as authority. What the word says is authoritative for us." Exactly the same phrase 
can be found in the Íåbara Bhå∑ya,39 but Bhart®hari clearly gives it a wider 
interpretation. His Våkyapad¥ya observes:40 "People accept the word as authority; they 
are followed [in this] by the religious and scientific treatises (ßåstra)." 
 We return to Bhart®hari's acceptance as the sentence as primary linguistic unit. 
This implies that the phenomenal world corresponds to statements, first of all Vedic 
statements. This explains that, according to Bhart®hari, injunctions and other rules are 
somehow built into the phenomenal world. Individual words do not constitute 
injunctions, or ßåstras, or rules of behavior for animals and men. And it is through its 
sentences that the Veda becomes what it is. If the world is created, or organized, in 
accordance with the Veda, Vedic sentences must be meant, not just individual Vedic 
words.  
 
I hope that what I have said so far shows the extent to which Bhart®hari was both a 
philosopher who dealt with current problems and challenges, and a traditionalist. In 
fact, his writings are quite specific about his respect for tradition. We read here, for 
example: "Without tradition, logic cannot establish virtue (dharma); even the 
knowledge of seers derives from tradition."41 And again: "He who bases himself on 
                                                
37 Vkp 1.27: ßi∑†ebhya ågamåt siddhå˙ sådhavo dharmasådhanam/ arthapratyåyanåbhede vipar¥tås tv 
asådhava˙// tr. Houben. 
38 Mahå-bh I p. 11 l. 1-2; p. 366 l. 12-13: ßabdapramåˆakå vayam/ yac chabda åha tad asmåkaµ 
pramåˆam/. 
39 ÍåbBh 3.1.36 (p. 184); cp. 6.1.3 (p. 183), 6.2.6 (p. 228), 10.5.73 (p. 431). 
40 Vkp 3.7.38cd: ßabdapramåˆako loka˙ sa ßåstreˆånugamyate. 
41 Vkp 1.30: na cågamåd ®te dharmas tarkeˆa vyavati∑†hate/ ®∑¥ˆåm api yaj jñånaµ tad apy 
ågamapËrvakam// 
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tradition ... is not hindered by logical arguments."42 His grammatical writing represents 
a change of attitude which Madhav Deshpande (1998: 20), from the University of 
Michigan, does not hesitate to characterize as a paradigm-shift. Unlike his main 
predecessors who lived a number of centuries earlier, with Bhart®hari "an entirely new 
tone has set in. There is a strong feeling that the current times are decadent, and that 
there are no truly authoritative persons around. Grammarians in this decadent period 
must look back to the golden age of the great ancient grammarians and seek authority in 
their statements."  
 One might be tempted to accuse Bhart®hari of using the philosophical debate of 
his time to try to gain respectability for the Vedic tradition to which he belonged, and 
one might very well be right in this. Let us not forget that philosophical debate during 
the first half of the first millennium was almost totally confined to Nyåya, Vaiße∑ika, 
Såµkhya and a number of Buddhist schools. None of these schools had any direct link 
with the Vedic textual corpus or with its ritual traditions. The opposition of Såµkhya to 
the Vedic tradition is testified to by texts from various periods, some as old as the 
Mahåbhårata, others much younger.43 And the early texts of Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika — 
though later categorized as orthodox, i.e. "Vedic" — show little evidence of having any 
particular link with Vedic texts and rites;44 the evidence we have rather points to a link 
with the worship of Íiva.45 The most orthodox schools of philosophy are, of course, 
                                                
42 Vkp 1.41: caitanyam iva yaß cåyam avicchedena vartate/ ågamas tam upås¥no hetuvådair na 
bådhyate// 
43 Cp. the passage in the Mahåbhårata (12.260-262) which records a discussion between Kapila, the 
supernatural "founder" of Såµkhya, and the Vedic ®∑i SyËmaraßmi. SyËmaraßmi rejects the possibility of 
liberation and exhorts to action; Kapila preaches liberation through restraint and abstention from activity. 
A late example is GuˆaratnasËri's Tarkarahasyad¥pikå on Haribhadra's ›a∂darßanasamuccaya (14th 
cent.), which states the following about the Såµkhyas (Mahendra Kumar Jain, 1969: 141): "They are 
numerous in Våråˆas¥. Many Brahmins, fasting for a month, follow the way of smoke which is opposed 
to the way of light. But the Såµkhyas follow the way of light. For that very reason the Brahmins, to 
whom the Veda is dear, follow the way of sacrifice. The Såµkhyas, on the other hand, turning away from 
the Veda which is rich in violence, proclaim the self." (våråˆasyåµ te∑åµ pråcuryam/ bahavo 
måsopavåsikå bråhmaˆå arcirmårgaviruddhadhËmamårgånugåmina˙/ såµkhyås tv arcirmårgånugå˙/ tata 
eva bråhmaˆå vedapriyå yajñamårgånugå˙/ såµkhyås tu hiµså∂hyavedaviratå adhyåtmavådina˙/) 
44 Here one could draw attention to the ‘proof’ in the Vaiße∑ika SËtra of the existence of seers (®∑i) 
responsible for the composition of the Veda (VS 6.1.1-2, ed. Jambuvijaya; Wezler, 1985), as well as to 
the occurrence, still in Praßastapåda's Padårthadharmasa∫graha, of Vedic cosmographical concepts 
(varuˆaloka ‘the world of Varuˆa’, ådityaloka ‘the world of Óditya’, marutåµ loka ‘the world of the 
Maruts’; see WI under these expressions). These or related terms occur in the Vedic Bråhmaˆas (see 
Kirfel, 1920: 5-6), a few times in the Mahåbhårata (Sörensen, 1904: s.v. Varuˆaloka, Våyuloka), but 
apparently only rarely, some of them perhaps not at all, in the later Puråˆic literature. The 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha does use Puråˆic, i.e. non-Vedic, material in the context of God's creation of the 
world, but this appears to be new material brought into the school by Praßastapåda himself (Bronkhorst, 
1996). 
45 A number of thinkers of the ‘old’ school of Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika — viz. Praßastapåda (probably), 
Uddyotakara, Bhåsarvajña, Vådi Våg¥ßvara — were Íaivites, or more specifically Påßupatas. See 
Bronkhorst, 1996 (Praßastapåda); final colophon of the Nyåyavårttika (Uddyotakara); Ingalls, 1962: 284; 
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PËrva- and Uttara-M¥måµså. The former does not really join the philosophical debate 
until Kumårila Bha††a, one or two centuries after Bhart®hari. The latter, better known by 
the name Vedånta (or Vedåntism), is perspicuous by its absence in listings of 
philosophical [485] schools during this early period. This does not necessarily mean 
that there were no Vedåntins during the early centuries of the first millennium,46 but it 
does strongly suggest that they did not yet participate in the philosophical debate, that 
they did not yet expose, and improve, their positions in the light of criticism received 
(and perhaps even solicited) from others. Bhart®hari may have been one of the first truly 
"Vedic" philosophers. He joined the philosophical debate, took up the challenges that 
occupied the other thinkers of his time, and constructed a system that gave a place of 
honor to the Veda and to the way of life it represented to its followers. Indeed, 
Bhart®hari maintains that the world has been created in accordance with the Veda, 
including the Vedic injunctions. Correct Brahmanical behavior is therefore anchored in 
the nature of the world itself, no less than the song of the cuckoo. 
 Bhart®hari did not take his task lightly. In his effort to find a place for the Veda 
in the philosophical debate of his time, he read everything he could lay his hands on, 
and borrowed elements from practically all his sources (without acknowledgments, 
unfortunately). Vaiße∑ika elements are particularly abundant, Buddhist elements are 
important, but scholars have also traced elements from Såµkhya and even from Jainism 
in Bhart®hari's work. No doubt from Buddhist sources Bhart®hari took the idea that the 
phenomenal world is not ultimately real. This allowed him to postulate a highest reality, 
which he calls on one occasion Brahman. He might in this way have claimed highest 
reality for the Vedic tradition, and leave ordinary reality (which is ultimately unreal) to 
the various philosophical schools that existed in his day. He does not do so. He accepts 
the relative validity of those schools of thought in the realm of the phenomenal world 
(this is his perspectivism), but adds an important element of his own: Phenomenal 
reality is determined by the Veda. The Veda is its creator (or organizer), and this 
means, in the end, that only the Vedic Brahmins know its nature and are really in a 
position to influence it. Seen in this way, Bhart®hari's ideas on language and reality, and 
                                                                                                                                               
Sarma, 1934 (Bhåsarvajña); Raghavan, 1942 (Vådi Våg¥ßvara). The Jaina doxographer Haribhadra, in his 
›a∂darßanasamuccaya, attributes the devatå Íiva to the adherents of Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika (Qvarnström, 
1999: 181). 
46 When e.g. Kålidåsa (Vikramorvaß¥ya 1.1) states vedånte∑u yam åhur ekapuru∑aµ, he refers to the 
Upani∑ads, but by doing so he may reveal the existence of people who looked upon the Upani∑ads with 
reverence. 
THE PEACOCK'S EGG  18 
 
 
on the relationship between these two, are really the result of a Brahmanical twist given 
to ideas that had been around for a while. 
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